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The Prelude To Jena

On October 14th 1806, the military might of Prussia was crushed by Napoleon’s Grande Armée in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt. But these battles were only the culmination of a campaign that many historians would agree demonstrated Napoleon’s method of waging war at its very finest. By way of a taster for the upcoming bicentennial re-enactment, this is the story of the lead-up to the two great battles...

The previous year, as Austria and Russia massed their forces against France, Prussia had remained on the sidelines in the hope of capitalising on the expected allied victory – the news of Napoleon’s victories at Ulm and then at Austerlitz had come as a huge shock therefore, and although Foreign Minister Haugwitz presented Prussia’s congratulations to the French Emperor for his victories it was readily obvious to Napoleon that these wishes had, “all too clearly been recently readdressed”. That Prussia had a quarrel with Imperial France was hardly surprising, for although she had withdrawn from the Revolutionary Wars as far back as 1795 Berlin had watched with trepidation France’s resurgence and expansion into German territory; in particular the 1803 seizure of Hanover, a territory which Prussia coveted for herself.

French violations of neutral Prussian territory during the march to Ulm and the post-Austerlitz dissolution of the old Holy Roman Empire were further causes for concern. Although King Freidrich-Wilhelm III and his adviser Haugwitz favoured peace there was also a war party centred around Queen Luise and including the influential courtier Karl von Hardenburg and several senior Generals. When Russia, engaged in peace negotiations since Austerlitz, called these off and prepared to resume hostilities in August 1806, the Queen’s party prevailed and Prussia too began to mobilise.

At this time, the Grande Armée was strung out across southern Germany in occupation of the territories captured the previous year, with some 250 miles separating the two flanks. In addition to the Imperial Guard, Napoleon had with him the forces he had used to such effect in the previous campaigning: Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, commanded I Corps, Marshal Louis Davout had III Corps and Marshal Nicholas Soult IV Corps, whilst V Corps was under the temporary command of Marshal François Levebvre. The fiery Marshal Ney commanded IV Corps, Marshal Pierre Augereau had VII Corps which was still largely unblooded through having been in reserve the previous year, and Marshal Murat, newly created Grand-Duke of Berg, retained command of the Cavalry Reserve. Before the fighting got underway, Marshal Jean Lannes would return to resume command of V Corps and Lefebvre would take over the infantry of the Imperial Guard, whilst Marshal Jean- Baptiste Bessieres oversaw the cavalry of that elite force. Brought up to nearly 9,000 men by the creation of new regiments, the Guard was even more than ever a force to be reckoned with. Second-line formations under King Louis Bonaparte of Holland and Marshal Edouard Mortier served as a reserve, along with contingents from France’s new German allies. In all, Napoleon could call upon some 180,000 troops.

On paper, Prussia too could field an impressive force, which was further increased by the forced incorporation of troops from the Electorate of Saxony whose territory had been occupied by Prussia in an attempt to prevent France incorporating it into the Confederation of the Rhine. However, whereas Napoleon had an army largely composed of experienced veterans, Prussian forces had not seen action for over a decade and the nation’s formidable military reputation was based largely on the victories of Frederick the Great half a century ago. Under the overall command of the King, Prussia’s forces were formed into two main armies, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick and the Prince of Hohenlohe- Ingelfingen, and three smaller detached corps under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, General Ernst-Philip von Rüchel, and the Duke of Würrttemburg. In all, these forces amounted to around 150,000 men, not counting garrison forces and the like.

Their effectiveness was reduced, however, by the failure to implement a modern system of divisions and corps, retaining instead mixed divisions of infantry and cavalry that left no concentrated reserves of either arm. Nor was there any effective organisation of artillery, most of which, even the heavy guns that in the French army formed reserve parks capable of creating massed batteries on the battlefield, was parcelled out to the individual brigades to increase their local firepower.

The commanders were largely tried and tested veterans of the wars of the Eighteenth Century, but were also generally elderly and lacking in any recent experience. Furthermore, there was also nothing approximating to a General Staff, which led to several independent and conflicting plans being proposed from which the weak-willed and militarily inexperienced Friedrich-Wilhelm was left topositions, such an offensive could quickly be launched, giving no time for the Russians to arrive and, indeed, driving a wedge between them and the Prussian forces.

Any Prussian offensive would have to turn back to defend the capital, forcing a battle perhaps on the Elbe or in the open country to the south. For the plan to succeed, however, the French had to cross the Thuringerwald rapidly and unmolested, and break out into the easier country beyond. To aid this, the entire army was arrayed in a formation known as “Le Bataillon Carré” – literally, “the battalion square” – in which the six army corps were arranged in pairs to form a left, right, and centre, with the guard and heavy cavalry forming a reserve and the light cavalry a screen. However, such was the flexibility of the army thanks to the corps system that, should the enemy prove to be on either flank, the whole army could simply wheel so that, for example, in a turn to the right the old right would become the centre, the centre the left, the left the reserve, and the reserve the right.

In fact, as Murat’s screening cavalry pushed onto the plains beyond the Thuringerwald, the reverse proved to be true, and the Prussians were a little to the west – that is, the left – of where Napoleon had anticipated their being. They were still, however, somewhat dispersed with the main body back around Weimar and Jena and scouting forces of various strengths strung out across a forty-mile front. Immediately to the French front were the advance forces of Hohenlohe’s army, with Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia’s Advance Guard Division around Saalfeld and General Bolesas von Tauenzien’s Left-Flank Corps further east at Schleiz. Because Soult and Ney on the French right had been delayed in their march, Napoleon ordered the central column – Bernadotte and Davout – to continue north-east through Schleiz to form a new right wing, whilst Soult and Ney swung west to join Lannes and Augereau advancing through Saalfeld. Leading the advance through Schleiz, Bernadotte quickly drove off Tauenzien’s mixed force of Prussians and Saxons with the aid of elements of Murat’s cavalry. At Saalfeld, however, vague orders from Hohenlohe left Prince Louis believing that he was required to hold the position, which commanded an important defile through which the French must pass, at all costs.

By the time that Brunswick, who was exercising loose control over all the forces by virtue of his seniority, learnt of the dispersed state of Hohenlohe’s forces and ordered a concentration, Marshal Lannes was already preparing to launch his corps against the isolated troops at Saalfeld. A Lieutenant-General at 33, Prince Louis was a leading light in the pro-war party, and a dashing commander of considerable ability. His forces at Saalfeld on the morning of October 10th 1806 consisted of a light infantry brigade under Generalmajor von Pelet with three battalions of fusiliers and two companies of jägers; an infantry brigade under Generalmajor von Bevilaqua comprising the Prussian Müffling Infantry Regiment and the Saxon Kurfürst and Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiments, all with two battalions; ten squadrons of hussars, some of them Saxons; and forty-four guns, mostly light. In total, Louis commanded some 8,300 men, whom he chose to choose a strategy to defeat Napoleon. On the one hand, the Duke of Brunswick favoured a rapid advance to catch the French still in their cantonments where they would be vulnerable and dispersed, whilst Prince Hohenlohe also favoured an advance, though on a wider front. Conversely, Colonel Scharnhorst, later the architect of Prussia’s post-1806 reforms and already a rising staff officer of noted ability, advocated a slow withdrawal in which space would be traded for time until Russian troops, and a further 25,000 Prussians under General Lestoq from East Prussia, could join the main army and raise it to overwhelming strength. Another staff officer, Colonel Massenbach, proposed a march towards the Danube in what was seemingly meant to be a show of strength intended to frighten the French off! The King initially adopted a compromise between the plans of Brunswick and Hohenlohe, Scharnhorst’s sensible withdrawal strategy being ignored along with Massenbach’s pointless military promenade, but later changed his mind again in favour of Brunswick’s original plan for a concentrated offensive. By this time, however, it was late September and the Grande Armée was already on the move.

Although somewhat mystified by the Prussian movements caused by the adoption of first one plan and then another, Napoleon quickly identified the best option of a concentrated French drive through the mountainous Thuringerwald and thence by Leipzig and over the Elbe for an advance on Berlin. Being easilymounted from the existing French positions, such an offensive could quickly be launched, giving no time for the Russians to arrive and, indeed, driving a wedge between them and the Prussian forces.

Although his orders from Napoleon were to await the arrival of Augereau’s troops before attacking, and although even his own second division was not yet up, Lannes was too good a soldier to let an opportunity of this magnitude slip away and immediately ordered Général de Division Louis-Gabriel Suchet to attack with his own twelve battalions and fourteen guns, supported by the light cavalry of Général de Brigade A.F. Trelliard. Further forces from the infantry division of Général de Division Honoré Gazan would arrive during the latter stages of the battle. In all, Lannes would eventually bring some 14,000 men to bear against Louis’ Prussians and Saxons. Throwing out Trelliard’s Hussars and Chasseurs as a screen, supported by a single infantry battalion, Lannes ordered Suchet to move the bulk of his division to envelop the Prussian left. It took time for Suchet’s infantry to deploy fully, but by 11.00 they were pushing in against the Prussian positions and Louis was forced to rush out reinforcements to counter the threat. At the same time, by way of a feint, he ordered his centre to advance and seize the hamlet of Beulitz, which became the centre of bitter fighting. For the best part of two hours the action raged fiercely all along the front, but slowly French numbers began to tell and elements of Louis’ forces began to fall back in disarray.

Desperate times calling for desperate measures, the Prince gathered together five squadrons of the Schimmelpfenning Hussars and in person led a cavalry charge against the French centre. Outnumbered almost three-to-one by Trelliard’s countercharging horsemen, the Prussian attack failed to push the French back and, in the ensuing melee, Prince Louis was killed in single combat with a French NCO, Quartermaster Guindet of the 10e Hussards. The death of their commander proved the final stroke, and, having already taken heavy casualties, the Prussians and Saxons broke and fled. Although benefitting from superior numbers, Lannes had managed to inflict some 2,400 casualties on his enemies, including 1,800 prisoners, and capture thirty-three guns. French casualties amounted to no more than 172 killed and wounded.

News of the death of Prince Louis and the defeat and dispersal of his troops caused consternation in the Prussian headquarters, not least because it confirmed the fact that the French had passed through the Thuringerwald in force and were already moving against the Prussian rear and lines of communication.

Deciding that discretion now represented the better part of valour, the Prussian commanders decided upon a staged retreat on the Elbe by way of Jena, Auerstadt and Leipzig. Unbeknownst to the Prussians, Napoleon, believing the main body of the Prussian forces still to be around Jena, was marching in force on that town, whilst Bernadotte and Davout swung out to the northeast to outflank what was believed to be the enemy left. In fact, the two marshals were marching straight into the path of Brunswick’s Prussians, who were leading the retreat whilst Hohenlohe and Rüchel held the rear at Jena. Still unsure of the exact locations and movements of the Prussian armies, Napoleon had nevertheless set in motion the chain of events that would lead to the two epic battles of Jena and Auerstadt.

By Andrew Bamford

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