# WHAT THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE REALLY MEANS

PRESIDENT'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY, IF ADHERED TO, PROMISES TO PREVENT THIRD WORLD WAR BY MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

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A MERICA'S new foreign policy (popularly known as the "Truman Doctrine") offers foreign countries financial and technical aid in preventing the imposition of Communist dictatorships on freedom-loving peoples.

The Truman Doctrine is the only road to lasting peace. Twice within 30 years the stubbornly-observed practise of "minding our own business" has brought us war.

On January 1, 1917, German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg told his imperial master not to worry if unrestricted submarine warfare brought a declaration of war from the U.S. "The most America will do," the Chancellor said, "is help England with food and money, send over some airplanes and maybe a few volunteers."

"We've taken all that into account," said Field Marshal von Hindenburg.

"Then go ahead with your submarine campaign!" said the Emperor. "We can disregard America!"

He thought differently in the fall of 1918, but it took a war to convince Germany's hasty Kaiser Wilhelm II that he had erred.

In 1933, Adolf Hitler said, "The U. S. is no threat to us! The inferiority and decadence of this allegedly new world is evident in its military inefficiency!"

In 1941, the Japanese General Staff carefully calculated that the blow at Pearl Harbor would so paralyze us that we would not be able thereafter to mobilize sufficient strength to attack Japan's new East Asian empire.

Hitler and the Japs were wrong, but to prove them mistaken cost us 300,000 dead. And we have only ourselves to blame for leading them to believe we would not fight, by talking about "neutrality" and "not becoming involved in foreign affairs."

We encouraged them to think we could not fight, by holding our military strength at a ridiculously low level, and advertising our notion of peace-by-isolation regardless of provocation.

Theodore Roosevelt advised America to "walk softly and carry a big stick!" When he became President, in 1901, the embers of a great European war were beginning to glow. The German Emperor was exhorting his soldiers to be more terrible than the Huns, and declaiming about "knights in shining armor."

Germany was building a navy to challenge Britain's rule of the seas. The French, Russians, Austrians and Italians were arming. The Russo-Japanese War which broke out in the Far East was universally accepted as the prelude to world-wide conflict.

But T. R., who had persuaded and cajoled successive Congresses into building a powerful U. S. Navy second only to Britain's, virtually compelled the Russians and Japanese to make peace; the treaty actually was signed on

American soil, at Portsmouth, N. H., in 1905. To emphasize U. S. determination to have peace, Roosevelt I sent 16 battleships on a round-the-world cruise in 1907, an impressive reminder, which was not lost on Europe's statesmen.

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For the period of time that he occupied the White House, Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in creating a positive American foreign policy directed toward the preservation of peace by timely preventive measures. But that policy, together with his wise naval planning, perished with his tenure of office.

President Wilson, in 1914, sent Colonel House to Europe in an effort to promote better understanding among the European powers. But House had nothing to offer save guarded phrases couched in diplomatic language.

If he could have intimated that America was strong, well armed, determined not to have a war, and firmly would oppose aggression, he might have succeeding in averting war. Actually, House's mission was soft-pedaled lest the President be accused of "meddling in European affairs."

British public opinion was pacifist, too, the government timid and hesitant, enervated by internal distractions, conscious of military weakness. Accordingly, the Germans assumed that neither England nor the U.S. would act; otherwise, they would not have invaded Belgium, for the German High Command had already agreed it would be dangerous to attack France unless the Huns could get around the French forts through Belgium.

Had Britain and America taken a firm stand, supported by a resolute public opinion, when it was clear that Germany was meditating war, there would have been no conflict in 1914, nor in 1939, and the world might never have heard of Adolf Hitler, or Mussolini.

We could have stopped Japan in 1931, when the Nips attacked China in violation of a solemn treaty in which we guaranteed China's territorial integrity. We did nothing. We could have stopped Mussolini in Ethiopia merely by cutting off his oil supply, and insisting that others do likewise. But we did not.

# Hitler Could Have Been Stopped in 1935

We could have stopped Hitler, in 1935, by insisting on forcible action when he sent troops into the Rhineland. The French hesitated, the British hung back. Both nations would have moved if they knew we would back them up. But we refused to become "involved."

Bitter Franklin D. Roosevelt-haters still insist he "got us into war." Actually, criticism of Roosevelt's leadership in foreign affairs should be limited to his failure to recognize the condition of world affairs back in 1933. By telling us what the score was, urging that we take a definite stand for peace, and making clear how an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, he might have avoided war.


Possibly, it might have cost him his reelection. In any event, he remained silent, and we lost 300,000 of our best kids, dead now in foreign graves, and 250,000 permanently maimed or blinded. And the world is in chaos and misery.

Henry Wallace, Senator Pepper and others who disapprove of the Truman Doctrine simply have forgotten their history lessons. Wallace misunderstandingly told a British audience that the Truman Doc-

trine indicates the U.S. is embarking on a course of "ruthless imperialism," which if not checked, will result in "an American empire stretching from pole to pole, and from China to the Near East!" But the facts we have to face are unpleasant enough!

A British statesman in London said to me, "The trouble with this business

of stopping Communism is that you inevitably find yourself mixed up with



velt's last term, urged England to join U. S. in checking Jap aggression. British refused.

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the most frightful bounders!"

We need not pretend that the current regime in Greece is composed of fine, democratic elements. On the contrary, strongly influenced by a few enormously wealthy families, it shoots, jails and exiles people (not all Communists) who disagree with it; and it is on the whole, corrupt, incompetent and irresolute.

But it must be conceded that the present Greek regime was chosen by the Greek people in an election carefully supervised by U. S., British and French observers, and, in the opinion of those observers, represents with reasonable

fairness the will of the majority.

True, the Greek people voted against Communism rather than in favor of the existing Government. They feared the moderates might prove susceptible to Communist infiltration. They wanted peace and a chance to rebuild their shattered lives, after years of war-bred chaos.

Their gallant resistance during World War II entitles the Greeks to whatever aid we can give them. But we shall not be helping them by handing over \$300-million to politicians now in power for spending as aimlessly (from the Greeks' point of view) as the \$400-million previously advanced by the retiring British.

We should supply Greece not only with money but with equipment, technicians and an intelligent plan for reconstruction and recovery leading even-

tually to a healthier, happier nation.

Will this involve us in Greek internal affairs? Yes, for a long time to come! Nor need we expect too much thanks for our efforts. The Greeks are rugged individualists who have never taken kindly to outsiders, not even when foreign money, arms and officers were helping them win their independence from the Turks, 100 years ago. Our sole satisfaction will be in a job well done, a brave people started on the path to recovery.

If we did not go to Greece's aid, the Greek government would be wholly incapable of preserving order. Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Albanian and Russian arms and men would swarm across Greece's frontiers to bolster the EAM

(Communist guerrillas).

Greece would soon be in the hands of an armed, militant minority controlled from Moscow. The Soviets would be firmly established on the flank of the world's greatest trade route. Russian prestige would rise in Turkey, Italy, North Africa and throughout the Middle East at the expense of our own, and of our hopes for peace.

War-weary peoples everywhere would conclude that a Soviet world was in the making, and that it would be suicidal to resist. "The Americans are turning their backs on us as they did in 1919," they would lament. "Let us hasten

to make our peace with the new masters!"

The presence of American technical and military advisers in Greece is notice to the Russians to keep hands off. And, of course, there is the powerful American Mediterranean fleet in Greek waters, to which Generalissimo Stalin ostentatiously announced that he was "wholly indifferent."

# U. S. Ships Prevented Tito Coup

When I was in Austria, in the summer of 1946, Stalin's good friend Marshal Tito was minded to end all argument concerning Trieste by taking the city over. He had the men to do it. Everybody in Vienna was talking about the imminent Tito coup. But two cruisers and four destroyers of our Mediterranean fleet unexpectedly steamed into the harbor of Trieste, as moral support for the few troops we and the British maintained along the Morgan Line.

Tito was not indifferent; he merely had an acute attack of sober second thought. Not that two cruisers and four destroyers could have stopped 250,000 Yugoslav troops, but they served as a reminder of length of Uncle Sam's arm.

It is not necessarily the force on hand that counts in power politics, but what the French used to call "the act of being present." We are "present" in Greece, and the Russians understand clearly what that means. Our \$100-million loan to Turkey, on the other hand, is for frankly mili-

tary purposes. German soldiers marched across Turkey in 1914, turned up in Syria and Palestine en route to the Suez Canal, and in Iraq, on the way to the Persian Gulf. Russia has no navy, no long-range air force. For a Russian soldier to reach

the Suez Canal, Africa, India, or the oil lands of the Persian Gulf, he must walk across Turkey, as the Germans did in 1914. Only the Turkish Army stands in his way. TURKISH OFFICERS LISTEN ATTENTIVELY AS U.S. ARMY ARTILLERISTS EXPLAIN THE WORK-

INGS OF MODERN GUN. TURKS ARE EXCELLENT FIGHTERS, BUT LACK EFFECTIVE WEAPONS



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#### Turkish Army Depends On Manpower

If the Russians thought they could do it safely, even with the Turks in their path they would try to seize the Suez Canal, the airfields of Egypt and Palestine (blocking the world's greatest trade route), and the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.

They would establish themselves in Africa, with its vast, undeveloped resources, and on the borders of India, where one-fifth of the world's population has launched an experiment in self-government.

The Turkish army is composed of good fighting men, but has little in the

way of modern equipment. It is especially short of armor, self-propelled guns, anti-aircraft artillery, rockets and first-class communications equipment. It must, therefore, rely on manpower.

If the Turkish air force is built up with planes, equipment and instructors, and if the Turkish army is supplied with modern weapons, and instructed in their use, Turkey will feel reasonably secure with fewer men under arms.

This, incidentally, will benefit the Turkish economy, for a considerable number of troops can then be released for industrial and agricultural pursuits. Moreover, the presence of U. S. military and air missions will serve, as in Greece, to put Russia on notice of our interest in Turkish security.

The Russians will have to bear in mind not only the tough Turkish infantry soldier, but also air groups ready to take off from American carriers in the

Aegean Sea.

Even with better equipment and U. S. carrier air support, the Turks could not stand off indefinitely a full-scale Russian attack. They could, however, delay the enemy until the arrival of U.S. aid.

In her present state of internal weakness, Russia must avoid a doubtful, dangerous war. She can undertake only such projects as are certain of success.

Certainly, we should try to bring about reforms calculated to ameliorate the living conditions of the Greek and Turkish masses. But because of their highly strategic geographical positions we cannot, in any event, permit Russia to take over either Greece or Turkey, regardless of our opinion of their present governments.

The Truman Doctrine does not end with Greece and Turkey. There is Korea, which Russian obstinacy has divided into two zones of occupation without free communication between them, but where we have definite obligations.

There are Germany and Austria, where with British and presumably French cooperation, we must return the inhabitants to useful employment, so they can earn their own livelihoods, cease to be a burden on American taxpayers and take part in reconstructing western European economy.

There is Hungary, from which the Russians are supposed to withdraw soon

after an Austrian treaty is ratified.

There is Czechoslovakia, turning ever more surely toward the west, where her businessmen and industrialists are more apt to find satisfactory markets.

There is India, torn by internal strife, seeking a way out of confusion and discord, and attempting self-government with a people unaccustomed to political responsibility. There is China, where a hopeful U. S. effort to end civil war went for

naught, but where 450-million Orientals need peace and order, after 10 years of war. Everywhere, the alternative to effective American aid is Communism, born

of despair, inspired and abetted by the Kremlin. Why cannot all this be done by the United Nations? Because the Russians

desire a result different from the one we seek. They hope existing confusion and misery will ripen into universal despair, and lead to the acceptance of a Soviet world, controlled, regimented and otherwise patterned on the U. S. S. R. -a world supervised by secret police, where people are told what they may do, think and say, where disagreement with the government means death or a concentration camp. As long as this is so, the United Nations can accomplish little, for the

Russians will thwart it at every turn. The record shows that this is true of the past. There is no reason to believe that they will suddenly cease to be obstructive. And each day that present conditions endure is a gain for their side, a loss to those eager for a world of freedom and justice under law. The Soviets fear our cooperative world which, to them, means the triumph

of capitalism and enslavement of the masses by what F.D.R. called the "princes of intrenched greed." They are pressing hard to get the kind of world they want. Wherever we show weakness, they push forward, using our concessions as bases for fresh demands. They have overrun eastern Europe, the Balkans and part of Korea, and

show no sign of moving out. They hold about half of Germany, in which we have no voice at all. Their notion of a proper German settlement appears to be one whereby they would share jurisdiction over our area, while we continued to exercise none over theirs. We made the atomic bomb, the most terrible weapon ever invented by man,

and used it to prevent the Japs from killing more of our boys. We then offered to give it up, provided suitable international safeguards could be devised against it ever being used again as a weapon by any nation, but permitting atomic energy's development by other nations for industrial or peaceful scientific purposes.

The Russians declined, because that would bring international inspectors

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to Russian soil. The Russian secret police would not consider it.

There can be no peace and no workable United Nations, unless the Soviet leaders are convinced that they cannot have a Soviet world by pressure, obstruction and force. Nor will there be a cooperative world unless the miser-. able, hungry, confused and hopeless peoples of Europe and Asia are convinced that we can, and will, protect them from Soviet aggression, and assist them in getting back on their feet.

The cost of supporting the Truman Doctrine by maintaining unchallengeable military strength at home and in such other parts of the world as may be required, will be heavy. But we would be foolish not to help others; more so to embark upon a program of aid to others without being so thoroughly prepared for any contingency as to raise a prohibitive doubt in the minds of a Soviet General Staff which might consider challenging us.


We can have peace at a price—and it will be less than price of another war.



Appropriately-dressed Turkish girls display trim, firm, healthy bodies on Istanbul athletic field. Modernization of Turkey began under Kemal Ataturk (Father of Turks), first president of Turkish Republic, unanimously elected in 1923 (reelected in 1927, 1931 and 1935) who abolished caliphate, monasteries, polygamy, ancient dress modes, inaugurated reforms

## MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

lived in Brooklyn, N. Y. for first eight years of his life, then moved with his family to Australia, where he was graduated



Melbourne University's from Trinity College, becoming an acting-major of infantry during World War I. Returning, later, to his homeland, he became an author, lecturer, radio commentator and newspaper columnist (he recently switched from N.Y. Herald-Tribune to N. Y. Post). Most recent book: The Strength We Need: A Military Program for America Pending Peace.

