


THE WEEK'S BIGGEST NEWS

The War: I-The U. S. Knew What the Risks Were

The U. S. had taken each step with its eyes open. It knew the war was spreading when Pres. Truman sent ships and planes, when later he ordered bombing of the home bases of the Communist invaders in North Korea. And when U. S. troops rushed to take over from routed South Koreans, America felt the anxiety that preceded Bataan. It also knew the alternative—watching free nations topple one by one. Few voices were raised in protest to the decisions of an awesome week (p. 13).

Background (QUICK Washington report): "The men who made the vital decision to send ground troops into Korea realized it was an irrevocable act. Bombing and naval shelling might have been carried on



with only the loss of a few planes. But ground fighting risked hundreds, perhaps thousands of casualties. Further, the policy makers acknowledged that the U.S. and Russia could go step by step into a state of general war.

"The Russians, with their 30 divisions in the Far East, could take the U.S. move as an invitation to enter the Korea fight. But the U.S. took a calculated gamble that

the war wouldn't spread. This was based on the conviction that the Red Army and Air Force weren't yet ready to move on a large scale in Europe."

The War: II-America's Front Line

U. S. forces moved as quickly as they could to bolster the new defense area proclaimed by Pres. Truman – Korea, Formosa, the Philippines (map, above) – and sent aid to Indo-China. Meanwhile, Russia menaced new fronts.

Background: One cause for worry in Washington was that the Korea action, grave as it was, might be only a Soviet feint. Russian troops had been reported gathering on the borders of Iran and Turkey. Short of oil, Russia might have a chance to fill its tanks by drives into its oil-rich Southern neighbors. One high U. S. official said he doubted the Russians could assemble at one point enough high-octane aviation gasoline for a single large-scale bombing raid on the continental United States.

The War: III-The Record Is Straight

Historians would have no puzzle on who started the outbreak. The U.N. named Red Korea the aggressor, called on member nations to drive the Communists back. For the first time, force was used to back up the orders of an international body.

Background: Russia called the U.N. action illegal on the ground that it had refused to take part in the Security Council sessions. But Russia had nullified its claim by conceding, in an earlier action, that refusal of a big power to take part didn't veto a Security Council decision. Moscow broadcast far and wide the charge that it was the South Koreans who provoked the war by launching an attack. This charge failed to hold up. A third of the South Korean Army was on leave when the fighting started.



Security Council Huddle: U. S. Ambassador Austin, U.N. Sec. Lie.

The Home Front Tightens

The U. S. was like 1941 again. Pres. Truman signed a new draft act. Washington speeded plans for mobilizing industry. Cities worried about civilian defense, asked the U. S. to help.

Background: Federal plans for civilian defense had been set to come out in September. But some areas didn't wait. N. Y. Gov. Dewey decided to "go ahead on our own," set up a state civil-defense authority. He also prepared to start a State Guard to take over from the National Guard if the latter was called to action.

West Coast cities pol-

ished up World War II airraid sirens. Their worry was
that the West Coast would
be hit first in any Russian
strike at the U. S. Reasons:
1) It's nearest to Russia of
any vital U. S. target areas.
2) It's the staging ground
for U. S. Pacific moves.



As this global projection shows, the West Coast is closest to Russia by air—but other areas aren't far.



John Gunther

The Japanese Seek Safety in MacArthur and the U. S.

John Gunther, special QUICK and LOOK correspondent, sends this story on General MacArthur and how Japan views the warfare.

TOKYO (by Wireless)—No people in the world could want a new world war less than the Japanese, who were all but blasted out of history by the last one. Yet most Japanese vigorously applauded Pres. Truman's decision to supply armed aid to South Korea, no matter what the risk.

We heard the news of the outbreak Sunday, up in the mountain village of Nikko, seat of Japan's most famous and exquisite shrine. If what may eventuate into World War III really began at 2:08 p.m. that day, it will always be a matter of mild interest to me to recollect that at that precise moment I was in stocking feet, inspecting the stone snails coming out of the head of a 16th century statue of Buddha. Back in Tokyo our car passed the headquarters of Gen. MacArthur (front cover). It was still brightly lit, and we saw hundreds of Japanese waiting patiently for a glimpse of the general.

"Next It Will Be Us"


For the next day or two the Japanese we met were angry and perplexed. It's extremely rare for any Japanese to criticize the United States or any aspect of the American occupation. But an emotion akin to terror broke through the usually porcelain-like exterior of our Japanese friends. One said: "First China, now Korea. Next it will be us. Unless the United States does something quickly, American prestige will collapse overnight throughout the Orient. We hate the Communists, but if America takes this attack lying down, thousands of Japanese will become Communist sympathizers."

The Japanese have no great fondness for Korea, nor do they view with relish the idea of a world war being fought to maintain spheres of influence in any country so inherently unimportant and remote. This makes it all the more remarkable that they should so wholeheartedly support our view that a supreme

principle was at stake and that armed action by the U. S. was imperative. Japan is unarmed. It hasn't a single soldier, gun or airplane. Its attitude is motivated in part by starkest considerations of fear and self-interest.

Why did the Communists attack South Korea at this time? The answer is double.

First, the attack was a countermove to recent negotiations here between MacArthur and Defense and State Dept. officials. Second, it was designed to



Gen. MacArmur

knock out the impending Japanese peace treaty. Indeed, any hope of an immediate overall treaty seems completely abolished by this week's events.

Gen. MacArthur is taking the crisis with all of

his celebrated poise, aplomb and confidence. Except for his trip to Korea, he hasn't changed his daily routine or odd working hours. He works as a rule from 11 a.m. until 2:30 p.m., then from about 6 until as late as necessary.

The secret history of the contacts between Tokyo and Washington since the outbreak cannot be written now. But it is taken for granted here that Mac-Arthur's urgent recommendations helped lead Pres. Truman to act as he did.



Gen. LeMay: He can hit anywhere.

I asked one Japanese today what he wanted in case the Korean campaign went badly. His answer: "Please annex Japan to the United States." For the Japanese, faith alone wouldn't save the country.

Where the U. S. Was Ready

One U.S. arm was at zero-hour readiness when the orders came- the Strategic Air Command of Gen. Curtis Le-May (l.). LeMay had three air forces at full wartime strength, prepared to deliver atomic attacks anywhere in


the world. They were the 15th at Riverside, Cal., the 8th at Ft. Worth, Tex., and the 2nd at Shreveport, La. Together, his 14 bomb groups had nearly 600 planes-including 90 giant B-36's. LeMay could draw from a stockpile of 400 atomic bombs, compared with Russia's 20 or 25. Where the U. S. Wasn't Ready

On the ground and at sea the picture was differ-

ent. Russia had 170 army divisions ready, the Western powers 43. Russia had 40,000 tanks; the West, 6,000. Overall Western naval strength was greater than Russia's, but Russia reportedly had 300 submarines-five times the number Hitler had when he launched World War II. When U.S. naval forces were ordered into action, only one U.S. carrier was in the Western Pacific, 100 were in "mothballs" in the U.S. The U.S. had no Marine regiments in Asia, 71,000 Marines in camps at home. A bright spot was the H-bomb project. N. Y.

Times science expert William Laurence predicted the U.S. could produce the H-bomb within a year, said Russia's H-bomb is no immediate threat.





Ex-Secretary. Louis Johnson sees an Acheson influence.

During the MacArthur Hearing of 1951 Louis Johnson recalled the earliest days of the Korean War and said that it was Secretary of State Dean Acheson who urged Truman to send troops. ~the Editor

Korea — Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the first to urge U.S. intervention in Korea, using planes and ships. The military were neither for nor against, merely stressing the difficulties ahead. When the President decided to intervene, Johnson personally urged that MacArthur run the operation. Soon after, the general reported that planes and ships were not enough. Within 24 hours he was given the right to land troops.

Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, former Army commander in China, revealed that MacArthur in 1945 denied him troops to keep the Russians out of Manchuria, believing they would be needed for occupation of a hostile Japan.